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TORTS-EFFECT OF A BREACH OF A SAFETY
STATUTE-PROXIMATE CAUSE
The recent decision of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
in the case of Newton v. Wetherby's Adm'x.1 raises a question
as to the application of a safety statute in a suit for personal
injuries. The plaintiff, a boy of eleven, was a passenger in
the defendant's car, which the latter was driving at a rate of
speed in excess of fifty miles per hour. The door on the
plaintiff's side of the car was hinged at the rear, and just prior
to the time of the injury, it was latched but not completely
closed. When the plaintiff attempted to close it by first open-
ing it, the pressure of the air threw it wide open dragging the
plaintiff, who held onto it, out of the car and severely injuring
him: A statute declared that a rate of speed in excess of forty
miles per hour was prima facie evidence of negligence.*-' In an
action to recover for the injuries sustained, the Court held
that the plaintiff had no cause of action (1) because the injury
which occurred was not the type which the legislature intended
to provide for and (2) because the violation of the statute was
not the proximate cause of the injury.
The first query which arises is whether or not such an
action may properly be brought under a safety statute. A con-
ceivable test as to whether or not a particular statute creates
a civil right of action for the breach of it has been thus stated:
"If the statutory regulation prohibits socially harmful conduct,
it may properly be construed as creating civil rights and
duties.''" However, the logic that any and every prohibitive
statute may be the basis of a ckil cause of action is somewhat
questionable.4  Since the statute expressly provides that a
breach thereof is prima facie evidence of negligence, this
problem is not directly presented by the principal case. If the
plaintiff is within the protection of the statute and there is
'287 Ky. 400, 153 S. W. (2d) 947 (1941).
'KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1936) sec. 2739g-51 (3).
3 Note (1925) 13 CALIF. L. REV. 428, 431.
'If it was the intention of the legislature to create a civil cause
of action, why was this not done expressly? Lowndes, Civil Lia..
bility Created by Criminal Legislation (1932) 16 MINN. L. REV. 316,
364.
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proximate cause, the statute impliedly gives the plaintiff a
right of action.
There is a split of authority as to the effect on negligence
of a breach of a safety statute. Some jurisdictions adhere to
the view that a violation of a safety statute is negligence per
se (i. c., conclusive evidence of negligence).5 This is the better
view. To hold otherwise is to place the opinion of a jury above
that of the legislature in the determination of a proper stand-
ard of care." But though this is true, the rule in some juris-
dictions is that a violation is prima facie evidence of
negligence. 7 The only logical reason for so holding is that it
would be unreasonable to construe each minor violation as
conclusive evidence of negligence. In the immediate case, the
statute expressly makes a violation only prima facie evidence
of negligence and that is controlling.8
In order for an individual to recover on the basis of a
violation of a safety statute, he must be one of the class of
persons whom the legislature intcnded specifically to protect.9
Perhaps the best test to ascertain whether the plaintiff comes
within this class in the present instance is suggested in Fairchild
v. Flemhing: "The speed limit is for the benefit of all who may
be injured by its nonobservance. "I" It would seem that a pas-
senger in a speeding automobile may be within this class."
Assuming that there was no negligence under such circum-
stances at common law, another requirement for recovery is
that the injury be of the type which the statute was intended
to prevent.Y: It is reasonable to assume that this statute was
'Home Laundry Co. v. Cook, 277 Ky. 8, 125 S. W. (2d) 763
(1939); PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 274; Note (1941) 29 KY. L. J. 489, 491.
"Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action (1941) 27 HARV. L.
REV. 317.
'PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 275; Note (1941) 29 KY. L. J. 489, 493.
'A discrepancy exists in the case of Murphy v. Homans, 286 Ky,
191, 150 S. W. (2d) 14 (1940) where a violation of a statute similar to
that under discussion was held to be negligence per se.
"HARPER, TORTS (1933) 193; PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 264; RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS (1934) sec. 286(a).
" 125 Minn. 431, 147 N. W. 434 (1914); approved in Berlin v.
Koblas, 183 Minn. 287, 236 N. W. 307 (1931).
" It was so held in Berlin v. Koblas, supra n. 10. The defendant
should have foreseen that a passenger in his car might be injured
due to his speeding (i.e. the plaintiff was a person within the risk).
" HARPER, TORTS (1933) 193; PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 264; see RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS (1934) sec. 286.
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designed to avoid injuries growing out of traffic and road con-
ditions. It cannot, however, reasonably be said that the statute
was clearly intended to prevent such an injury to a passenger
in an automobile. The closing of an unfastened door while
the vehicle is in motion has no relation to traffic or road con-
ditions. Such a situation is highly unusual, too rare in fact
to call for legislation.
Even assuming that the elements of liability are otherwise
present, the question of proximate cause remains to be deter-
mined. Legal causation and breach of duty should be established
before liability can be created.'" The same tests 'of causation
are applied where there is a breach of a statutory duty as are
followed where there is a deviation from a common law duty.14
Where the question of causation is such that reasonably prudent
men ought not to differ, an issue of law arises to be determined
by the court; otherwise there is an issue of fact for the jury
and it is determined under instructions by the proper applica-
tion of the principles of causation. 1 There was causation here.
The "but for" rule is not determinative in ascertaining
whether the violation was the proximate cause of the injury
since it is conclusive only when the injury would not have
occurred save for the alleged negligence. 1  Here, the jury
'Phillips v. Scott, 254 Ky. 340, 71 S. W. (2d) 662 (1934); PRos-
SER, TORTS (1941) 264; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) sec. 286.
14RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) see. 286, comment J. The writer
queries whether the act which constituted the violation or the viola-
tion itself should be used to test causation. Lowndes, Civil Liability
Created by Criminal Legislation (1932) 16 MINm. L. REv. 361, 370.
'Denker Transfer Co. v. Pugh, 162 Ky. 818, 824, 173 S. W. 139,
141 (1915). Approved in Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Union
Transfer and Storage Co., 205 Ky. 651, 657, 266 S. W. 362, 364 (1924);
Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action (1914) 27 HARV. L. REy.
317, 321.
16 This is a test of exclusion and in the breach of a statutory duty,
it is usually applied in this manner, "If the defendant is negligent
per se, he will be liable unless the injury would have occurred even
had there been an observance of the statute." Note (1932) 32 COL.
L. REV. 712, 719. This is also applicable when there is a statute
which provides for prima facie evidence of negligence. There the
burden of proof is placed upon the defendant. An excellent illu-
stration of the use of this rule exists in the case of Martin v. Herzog,
838 N. Y. 164, 126 N. E. 814 (1920). There a plaintiff who was driv-
ing without lights in violation of a statute, collided with the defen-
dant, who was driving on the wrong side of the road. He was not
denied recovery because of contributory negligence since his automo-
bile was perfectly visible without lights and the collision would have
occurred anyway. Compare Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Union
Transfer and Storage Co., 205 Ky. 651, 266 S. W. 362 (1924).
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might well find that the excessive speed of the car was one
cause of the injury inasmuch as the greater the speed of the
vehicle, the greater the air force against the door; but it can
scarcely be said that the accident would not have occurred
"but for" the excessive speed. The "substantial factor" test
might be applied inasmuch as the jury might find that the
excessive speed was a substantial factor in causing the injury.
Yet, it does not necessarily follow that there would be liability.
The injury should be the natural and probable consequence of
the wrongful act (i. e., the defendant should foresee that if
he violated the statute, such an injury as this might occur).17
It is apparent that the plaintiff's being dragged from the
vehicle was not the natural and probable result of the excessive
speed nor should the defendant have foreseen that the plaintiff
would be injured in such a manner. Therefore, the injury
which occurred was not within the risk assumed by the de-
fendant. The direct and proximate cause of the injury was
the act of the plaintiff in opening the door. The same result
was reached in Htubbnzer v. FisclherIs on a similar statement of
facts. Where there is a breach of a statutory or common law
duty, each case must stand on its own facts and be determined
by the applicable rules of causation.19 No infallible rule exists.
The principle case seems to be correctly decided. The harm
which occurred was not one of the type which the legislature
intended to provide for, and the violation of the statute was
not the proximate cause of the injury. The absence of either
of these requirements is sufficient to prevent recovery.
C. KILMER COM3BS
'"PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 342-343; contra In re Polemis, 3 K. B.
560 (1921).
"232 Wis. 600, 288 N. W. 254 (1939).
' Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 105, 41 N. W. 543, 544(1889).
